

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 TEL AV 10332 01 OF 02 111910Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /026 W  
-----054031 111913Z /45

Z O 111802Z AUG 78

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4848  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY PAIRS IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION SINAI IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 10332

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR, MILI, XF, IS, LE

SUBJECT: 11 AUGUST MEETING WITH WEIZMAN

REF: STATE 203301, TEL AVIV 10254, TEL AVIV 10282

SUMMARY: MY AUGUST 11 MEETING WITH WEIZMAN RESULTED  
IN: (A) AN UNDERSTANDING THAT STATEMENTS BY GOI OFFICIALS  
IMPUGNING LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY ARE MAJOR OBSTACLES  
TO PROGRESS AND SHOULD BE STOPPPED; (B) RE-CONFIRMATION THAT  
ISRAEL AGREES TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF A LEBANESE  
ARMY BATTALION IN SOUTH LEBANON; (C) IF THE LEBANESE MOVE BY  
AIR, ONE COMPANY CAN GO AND A POSSIBLE FLIGHT PATH WAS  
ESTABLISHED; (D) IF THE MOVE IS MADE BY LAND, AVOIDING THE  
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PAGE 02 TEL AV 10332 01 OF 02 111910Z

CHRISTIAN ENCLAVES, THE LEBANESE CAN BE ESCORTED BY SYRIANS  
TO THE LITANI RIVER AND THE ENTIRE BATTALION CAN GO  
WITH ALL ITS EQUIPMENT; (E) WEIZMAN SAID HE WOULD  
NOT HIMSELF MEET JUST NOW WITH ERSKINE, BUT AGREED TO AN EITAN-GAZIT-  
ERSKINE MEETING; (F) GOI WILL MAKE A PRESS STATEMENT TONIGHT  
SAYING THAT THE GOI SUPPORTS UN RES. 425; (G) WEIZMAN  
WILL COUNSEL HIS COLLEAGUES TO AVOID THE USE OF THE TERM

"MASSACRE". THE NEXT MOVE IS UP TO THE GOL. END SUMMARY

1. I MET WITH WEIZMAN AT 1500 TODAY TO CARRY OUT THE INSTRUCTIONS IN STATE 203301, AS AMDNDDED BY LEWIS/DRAPER SECURE TELECON. ALSO IN ATTENDANCE WERE DEPUTY MINISTER ZIPPORI, CHIEF OF STAFF EITAN, DMI GAZIT AND COL. TEHILA. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY BLACKWILL AND COL. WILLIAMS.

2. I BEGIN BY STATING THAT THE INITIAL REPORTS OF THE MEETING BETWEEN EITAN AND ERSKINE CONTINUE TO RESULT IN VERY UNFORTUNATE FALLOUT IN SEVERAL PLACES. I TOLD THEM THAT THE UN HAD REPORTED TO THE LEBANESE WHAT ERSKINE HAD THOUGH HE HAD HEARD. THUS THE ERSKINE VERSION WAS VIEWED AS EXPRESSING THE ISRAELI POSITION. I SAID THAT WE HAD ASKED AMBASSADOR PARKER IN BEIRUT TO CLARIFY WITH THE LEBANESE THE ISRAELI POSITION AS REFLECTED IN THE EITAN-WILLIAMS MEETING (TEL AVIV 10254). HOWEVER, THE EFFECT OF THE INITIAL ERSKINE REPORT COULD BE A LEBANESE CALL FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. GIVEN THE EXISTING SITUATION IN SOUTH LEBANON ISRAEL COULD NOT EXPECT SUPPORT. I HAD ASKED FOR THIS MEETING SO THAT WE MIGHT ONCE MORE CAREFULLY REVIEW THE SITUATION TO BE SURE THAT THERE WERE NO MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

3. I EXPLAINED THAT REGARDLESS OF WHAT VARIOUS GOI OFFICIALS PERSONALLY THOUGHT AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A  
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SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 10332 01 OF 02 111910Z

REAL OR EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THESE ISRAELI OPINIONS NOT BE VOICED. I SAID THAT GOI CHALLENGES TO LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT DO NOT BUILD CONFIDENCE AND THEY ARE QUICKLY MISUNDERSTOOD BY ALL WHO HEAR THEM. WEIZMAN RESPONDED THAT HE GOT THE MESSAGE AND IT WAS OBVIOUS TO US THAT EITAN ALSO CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD.

4. I NEXT CONFIRMED, AS EITAN HAD MADE CLEAR TO WILLIAMS, THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF A LEBANESE ARMY BATTALION IN TIBNIN. BOTH WEIZMAN AND EITAN CONCURRED THAT THIS IS, AND HAS BEEN, THE ISRAELI POSITION. MOVING TO THE METHOD AND ROUTE OF MOVEMENT OF THE UNIT TO TIBNIN, I SAID IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL DID NOT OBJECT TO THE MOVE OF THE BATTALION BY ROAD, AVOIDING THE ENCLAVE BY PASSING THROUGH NABITIYYA TO THE AKIA BRIDGE AND ON TO TIBNIN. ALL UNHESITATINGLY, AGREED. I SAID IT WAS ALSO MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS MOVE COULD BE MADE UNDER SYRIAN ESCORT PROVIDED THAT THE GOI HAD BEEN NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE AND THAT THE SYRIAN ESCORT WOULD RETURN TO THE NORTH AFTER SEEING THE LEBANESE SAFELY TO THE AKIA BRIDGE. WEIZMAN

IMMEDIATELY STATED THAT THIS WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT  
OF ISRAEL WITH THESE STATED CONDITIONS. HE WENT ON  
TO SAY THAT HE RECOMMENDED THIS MOVE AS PREFERABLE TO THE ONE  
BY HELICOPTER. WHEN QUERIED, EITAN SAID THAT NOT ONLY WOULD THIS BE  
THE PREFERRED ROUTE, BUT THAT THE ENTIRE UNIT COULD MOVE AND  
COULD TAKE WITH IT "ALL THE HEAVE EQUIPMENT THEY LIKE."  
WEIZMAN CONFIRMED THAT, "FROM A SOVEREIGNTY POINT OF VIEW,"  
IF THE LEBANESE TAKE THE NABITIYYA-AKIA BRIDGE ROUTE  
THEY CAN GO WITH ANYTHING THEY WANT. HE THEN ADDED THAT  
IF THEY PREFERRED TO FLY BY HELICOPTER WITH ONE COMPANY,  
IT WAS OBVIOUS THA THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO TAKE THE  
HEAVY EQUIPMENT WITH THEM. FURTHER, HE EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN  
OVER THE ISRAELI ABILITY TO TOTALLY CONTROL THE  
CHRISTIANS. GOI COULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT SHOTS WOULD NOT  
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SECRET

PAGE 04 TEL AV 10332 01 OF 02 111910Z

BE FIRED AT THE LEBANESE HELICOPTERS IF THEY FLEW NEAR

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 10332 02 OF 02 111927Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /026 W  
-----054905 111930Z /42

Z O 111802Z AUG 78

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4849  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION SINAI IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 10332

EXDIS

THE ENCLAVES. I THEN ASKED IF THERE WASN'T SOME ALTERNATE HELICOPTER ROUTE WHICH COULD BE FLOWN DURING DAYLIGHT AND WHICH WOULD AVOID THE ENCLAVES? EITAN AND I QUICKLY REVIEWED A MAP OF THE AREA AND EITAN SKETCHED OUT A FLIGHT ROUTE WHICH WENT NORTH FROM KAWKABA THEN WEST AND SOUTH TO TIBNIN, AVOIDING NABITIYYA BY FLYING TO THE WEST OF THE TOWN. BOTH WEIZMAN AND EITAN SAID THAT THIS ROUTE OR ANY ROUTE NORTH OF THE LITANI RIVER WOULD AVOID CHRISTIAN FIRE

BUT, OF COURSE, WOULD EXPOSE THE HELICOPTERS TO PALESTINIAN FIRE. BOTH AGAIN INDICATED THAT A SYRIAN ESCORTED LAND MOVE WOULD BE SAFER AND IS THE PREFERRED ROUTE RECOMMENDED BY THE ISRAELIS. I THEN BROUGHT UP TIMING OF THE MOVE. WEIZMAN SAID THAT AS LONG AS PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN WORKED OUT; I.E.,

SECRET

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 10332 02 OF 02 111927Z

NOTIFICATION

OF THE ISRAELIS OF THE METHOD AND ROUTE OF MOVE AND WHETHER OR NOT THE SYRIANS WILL PARTICIPATE, THE BATTALION COULD MOVE AT ANY TIME.

5. I THEN BROUGHT UP THE SUGGESTION THAT THERE BE A MEETING BETWEEN WEIZMAN AND ERSKINE AS A FURTHER STEP IN CLEARING UP AN MISUNDERSTANDING GENERATED BY THE EITAN-ERSKINE MEETING. WEIZMAN TURNED ME DOWN COLD. HE MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT HE IS NOW A CIVILIAN MINISTER, AND THAT IDF MILITARY SHOULD DEAL WITH GEN. ERSKINE. "I HAVE NOTHING TO MEET WITH ERSKINE ABOUT, BUT I AM READY TO MEET WITH SARKIS, KHOURY OR BOUTROS AT ANY MOMENT." HE DID SAY THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO SEND GAZIT WITH EITAN SO THAT THEY COULD CLEAR THE AIR. AT THIS POINT GAZIT INSERTED THAT HE HAD MET WITH ERSKINE AUGUST 10 AND HAD "SOOTHED HIM."

6. I THEN RETURNED TO EITAN'S COMMENTS ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY (WHICH BY THE WAY HE DID NOT DENY DURING TODAY'S MEETING) AND EXPLAINED THAT THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM IS TO TRY TO REDUCE THE POLITICAL IMPACT IN BEIRUT CAUSED BY ERSKINE'S REPORT. I SAID THAT A PUBLIC STATEMENT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL AND URGED THAT IN THIS STATEMENT GOI MAKE CLEAR ITS SUPPORT OF ALL ASPECTS OF 425, INCLUDING THE REESTABLISHMENT OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY IN SOUTH LEBANON. WITHOUT A SECOND'S HESITATION WEIZMAN SAID, "NO PROBLEM, IT WILL BE ON TV TONIGHT." (WE WILL SEND TEXT OF THE STATEMENT AS SOON AS RECEIVED FROM THE MINISTER'S OFFICE WHICH HAS PROMISED TO GIVE IT TO US WHEN FINALIZED) GENERALLY, WEIZMAN AND I AGREED THAT THE TEXT WOULD READ SOMETHING LIKE THE FOLLOWING: (WEIZMAN'S WORDS) "THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL BELIEVES THAT THE RESTORATION OF NORMAL LIFE AND SOVEREIGNTY IN LEBANON IS IMPERATIVE TO THE

FUTURE OF LEBANON, THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL AND  
THE WELL-BEING AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN NEIGHBORS."

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 10332 02 OF 02 111927Z

AND I THEN ADDED "AND THE GOI CONTINUES TO SUPPORT ALL  
ASPECTS OF UN RESOLUTION 425." WEIZMAN AGREED AND TOLD  
GAZIT TO DRAFT THE RELEASE.

7. WE THEN SHIFTED TO DISCUSSION OF BEIRUT. I REVIEWED  
THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT WHICH HAD RESULTED IN THE  
TENUOUS CEASEFIRE AND EMPHASIZED EMPHASIZED THAT PUBLIC STATEMENTS  
CONCERNING "MASSACRE" OF THE CHRISTIAN POPULATION IN  
BEIRUT ONLY SERVED TO INFLAME THE SITUATION AND REQUESTED  
THAT THE USE OF THE WORD BE AVOIDED. WEIZMAN SAID "I DON'T  
USE THE WORD MASSACRE -- I WILL  
PASS YOUR MESSAGE ON TO THE PRIME MINISTER-- I WILL PASS IT  
ON TO THOSE GOI AUTHORITIES WHO USE IT (MASSACRE)".

8. COMMENT:  
ISRAELIS DISPLAYED WILLINGNESS TO GO ALONG WITH ALMOST  
EVERYTHING I SUGGESTED. THE ONLY EXCEPTION WAS WEIZMAN'S  
REFUSAL TO MEET WITH ERSKINE. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT  
ANOTHER MEETING BETWEEN EITAN AND ERSKINE, THIS TIME ATTENDED  
BY GAZIT, WILL BE ALMOST AS EFFECTIVE IN STRAIGHTENING  
ERSKINE OUT AS ONE WITH WEIZMAN IN ATTENDANCE WOULD BE.

9. AT THIS POINT, THE ONLY OBJECTION THE ISRAELIS HAVE TO THE  
MOVEMENT OF THE BATTALION TO TIBNIN IS ANY ATTEMPT TO MOVE BY ROAD  
THROUGH THE ECHRISTIAN ENCLAVES.  
IN SHORT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS NOW GIVEN THE GOL TWO OPTIONS  
TO GET ITS TROOPS TO TIBNIN -- MOVEMENT BY HELICOPTER OF ONE COMPANY  
OR MOVEMENT OF THE ENTIRE BATTALION, TOGETHER WITH ITS  
EQUIPMENT AND ESCORTED BY SYRIANS PART WAY. BOTH OF THESE OPTIONS  
FINESSE THE HADDAD PROBLEM. IT IS NOW UP TO THE LEBANESE  
GOVERNMENT. I DON'T SEE WHAT ELSE WE  
WE CAN DO HERE, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF PARKER'S LATEST REPORT (BEIRUT  
4676) THAT BOUTROS WANTS TO MULL THINGS OVER FOR A FEW DAYS.  
WEIZMAN IS ALSO HOPING FOR A LITTLE REST OVER THE  
WEEKEND. HE KNOWS BEYOND A SHADOW OF A DOUBT ALREADY  
THE NECESSITY OF AVOIDING ANY MORE SHELLING BY HADDAD.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEL AV 10332 02 OF 02 111927Z

HOWEVER, I HAVE SENT HIM A MESSAGE VIA TEHILA THIS EVENING  
THAT THE IDF MUST CONTINUE TO IMPRESS UPON HADDAD THAT IT  
IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL NO RENEWED SHELLING OF THE LAF  
TAKE PLACE.

LEWIS

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## Message Attributes

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**To:** STATE BEIRUT  
**Type:** TE  
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